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A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF 
COALITION GOVERNMENTS 
Ingo von Münch * 
In September and October 1998 Professor von Münch was a visiting fellow of the New 
Zealand Institute of Public Law.  During an extremely busy visit, Professor von Münch gave a 
number of seminars on aspects of German Constitutional and Electoral Law.  These seminars, 
given by both a leading Constitutional and Electoral Law academic and a former deputy prime 
minister of the State of Hamburg and former member of the Bundesrat, or German Senate, were 
timely given the trials and tribulations of New Zealand's first MMP Coalition Government 
which had then just ended in the sacking of the minor party's leader as Deputy Prime Minister. 
In contrast to much of the contemporary gloom at the perceived failed hope of MMP, Professor 
von Münch presented a hopeful view of both the electoral system that New Zealand had imported 
from Germany and of the possibilities of Coalition Government. The following is an enlarged text 
of a speech, delivered to the Public Law section of the New Zealand Ministry of Justice. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the world governments formed by a coalition are not seen as a rare 
exception but, at least in some parts of the world, as the typical political situation.  In 
Europe, Coalition Governments presently govern the vast majority of countries. 1 
In the Pacific, Australia and Japan are prominent examples of countries governed by 
coalition.  New Zealand has had a Coalition Government during the years and a half was 
terminated only very recently. 2 
* Dr Jur (Frankfurt/Main), Dr Jur hc (Rostock), Emeritus Professor of Constitutional Law and Public 
International Law, Hamburg, Germany. The author thanks Dr Petra Butler (Ministry of Justice) for 
organising the meeting and the editor for checking the translation.  The responsibility rests with 
the author. 
1 Examples are: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania.
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The European examples were taken from today.  Tomorrow, some of these coalition 
governments might have already broken up. Coalitions are contrary to eternity.  In some 
countries the situation is even unclear. Is Russia being governed by a coalition at present 
or by some other form of government?  We do not know this precisely. 
The classic example of a country governed by coalitions for decades is Germany. 
From the very beginning of the so­called Weimar Republic (the first democratic German 
State) in 1919 ­ until shortly before Hitler's seizure of power in 1933, all governments in 
the Weimar Republic were composed of coalitions.  The Federal Republic of Germany 
("FRG"), founded in 1949, continues this tradition.  All German Federal governments 
since that time have been, without any exception, formed by coalitions. 3 
The history of the German States (the "Länder") within the Federation has been 
slightly different.  Only about 60% of the various and numerous States' governments 
(Landesregierungen) have been coalition governments, and this is still the situation at 
present. 4 Summarising, we may say: The Federal Republic of Germany is a Coalition 
Republic. 
Having in mind the great importance of Coalition Governments in history and politics 
in Germany, we have to observe an astonishing asymmetry between the political 
importance of this issue on the one side and the absence of legal regulations at the other 
side.  Neither the Constitution of the FRG (the "Grundgesetz" or Basic Law), nor the 
Federal Electoral Law, nor any law of the individual States, even mention the words 
"Coalition Government".  Among hundred thousands of Court decisions there is only one 
about legal problems of a Coalition Government 5 and only rather few publications deal 
with this topic 6 although legal problems do exist. 
2 The National ­ New Zealand First colation was de facto terminated August 1998 on the dismissal 
of the Hon Winston Peters as Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer.  The coalition had governed 
since December 1997 under a formal coalition agreement. 
3 See Ingo von Münch, Rechtliche and politische Probleme von Koalitionsregierungen (Berlin/New York, 
de Gruyter, 1993) 33 and following. 
4 The Federal Republic of Germany consists of 16 States, 10 of which are at present (1 December 
1998) under the administration of Coalition Governments, 5 under the administration of a One­ 
Party­Government, 1 under the administration of a One Party­Minority­Government. 
5 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the Federal Civil Court) 
BGHZ, 29 187.  The Court had to decide whether a tape of negotiations for concluding a Coalition 
Agreement had to be handed over to the partner of the negotiations.  The then Federal Chancellor 
and Leader of the CDU had refused such a handing over, arguing that the tape contained 
confidential information about foreign affairs. 
6 The most important articles are cited by Ingo von Münch, above n 3 and by R Zuck, 
"Verfassungswandel durch Vertrag?" [1998] Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 457.
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II DISTINGUISHING COALITION GOVERNMENTS FROM OTHER 
FORMS OF GOVERNMENTS 
Discussing legal problems of Coalition Governments we have to clarify, first of all, 
what the term "coalition" means in this respect.  Due to the fact that ­ at least in the FRG ­ 
no legal definition of this notion exists, it might be useful to approach the meaning of the 
term "coalition" from a negative point of view. 
(a) No coalition is an alliance of political parties agreed upon before a general 
election.  A coalition can only be formed on the premise that a general election has 
taken place and that a joint government composed of different political parties ­ a 
coalition government ­ has to be installed. 
(b) A Coalition Government is more than a mere support for a government, 
given by one or more political parties.  An example of such a supported government 
is that of Sweden after the election of the National Parliament ("Riksdag") on 23 
September 1998. The then ruling Social­Democratic Party of Prime Minister Persson 
had won only 36.6 percent of the vote.  To continue his government Mr Persson 
needed the consent of at least two other political parties; he got this support after talks 
with the Left Party ("Vånstre") and with the Green Party, three days after the election. 
But Mr Persson had declared immediately after the closing of the polls that he 
excluded the possibility of a "Coalition Government".  Due to this decision, the Left 
Party and the Greens are not represented in the Swedish Government, but are fighting 
alongside the Government against the Opposition. 
(c) The difference between such support of a Government like that in Sweden 
on the one hand and a mere toleration of a Government on the other side lies in the 
fact that a political party which only tolerates the Government does not play an active 
role in favour of the political activities of the Government, but refrains only from 
voting in decisive questions against the Government. 7 
(d) Toleration of a Government is a formless process.  The tolerating party 
does not conclude an agreement with the tolerated Government.  But imagination and 
creativity regarding Coalition Governments are boundless: the newest idea in one of 
the German States has been a so­called "toalition".  In Mecklenburg­Vorpommern in 
Eastern Germany the Government was formed by a coalition of the CDU and the 
SPD. 8 Because of personal rivalries between the Prime Minister (a member of the 
7 This is the situation in the German State of Sachsen­Anhalt; in this State a One­Party­Minority 
Government of the SPD is tolerated by the PDS. 
8 Abbreviations used for the major German political parties are as follows: CDU: Christlich­ 
Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Conservatives); SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (Labour); FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Liberals); Die Grünen:
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CDU) and the Deputy Prime Minister (a member of the SPD) and because of tensions 
between these two political parties, there was a discussion about the political future of 
governing the State after a possible breaking down of the Coalition Government then 
in power.  The SPD intended to govern the State after the next election with a 
Minority Government 9 tolerated by a second political party the PDS (the successor of 
the former Communist Party).  The PDS demanded recognition as an equal partner, 
and declared that it was not  satisfied with the role of a mere tolerating party without 
any formalisation of this status.  Therefore, the idea was born to fix principles and 
guidelines of the intended toleration in a written agreement.  If such an agreement 
had been concluded between both political parties, the situation would have drawn 
near to a coalition, without being a coalition in the traditional sense of this word.  One 
might call this connection a "toalition".  In fact, at the end of the discussion, the idea 
was not realised; instead, a "normal" coalition was   established between the SPD and 
the PDS. 
(e) Another German political special situation has been created in the City 
State of Hamburg.  The STATT­Partei (which might be translated as "The 'instead of' 
Party"), which claimed to be an alternative to the other, "established" political parties, 
agreed after the 1993 election in Hamburg to be a partner of the SPD in the State 
Government and to fix this partnership in a written agreement.  In contrast to the 
typical procedure of establishing a Coalition Government, the STATT­Partei did not 
nominate members of the party to serve as ministers for the Government but 
independent persons.  For this reason the STATT­Partei insisted on naming the 
agreement with the SPD not as a "Coalition Agreement", but a "Co­operation 
Agreement" ("Kooperationsvertrag").  According to my view, there is neither a legal 
nor a substantial political difference between such a "Co­operation Agreement" and 
the traditional "Coalition Agreement". 
III THE LEGAL NATURE OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS 
German public lawyers are in the midst of an exciting legal problem.  Although the 
FRG, as mentioned above, has been a "Coalition Republic" since 1949, there still exists a 
controversy in German legal science on the question of the nature of Coalition 
Agreements.  Three different positions are commonly taken in regard to this question: 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Greens); PDS: Partei für den demokratischen Sozialismus (Successor of 
the SED: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – Communists in the former German 
Democratic Republic commonly referred to East Germany). 
9 Minority Governments are a very rare exception in Germany.  For the legal problems see K 
Finkelnburg, Die Minderheitsregierung im deutschen Staatsrecht (de Gruyter,  Berlin/New York, 
1982).
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(a) Coalition Agreements are not legal instruments but only political 
settlements. 10 Coalition Agreements are ­ according to this position ­ only 
"gentlemen's agreements" (which presumes that political parties are gentlemen ­ a 
presumption that may raise some doubts). 
(b) Coalition Agreements are binding legal instruments like other legal 
agreements, but are governed by Public Law. 11 
(c) A third view regards Coalition Agreements as non­justiciable legal 
instruments.  In my opinion this is the right view. 12 The contents of a Coalition 
Agreement deal, amongst other things, with the composition of a Government, with 
the aims of the policies of the Government, and with voting in Parliament.  All these 
matters involve Constitutional Law.  But, the peculiarity of Coalition Agreements is 
the fact that these agreements contain imperfect obligations, which are unenforceable 
in the Courts.  Imperfect obligations are not an unknown phenomenon in law, but 
well­known already in ancient Roman Law as "obligationes naturales".  In modern 
Public International Law the idea of the existence of a so­called "soft­law" is a wide 
spread idea. 13 In British Parliamentary practice, there exist "conventions". Different 
legal agreements may have different legal strength. 
IV WHY OUGHT COALITION AGREEMENTS  NOT BE ENFORCED BY 
COURTS? 
Why are Coalition Agreements not justiciable in the Courts?  The answer results from 
the contrast between the Coalition Agreement "Law" on the one side and Constitutional 
Law on the other side.  This issue may be illustrated by giving three examples: 
(a) According to the Constitution of the FRG, the Federal Chancellor 
("Bundeskanzler") has the discretion to decide on the composition of his Cabinet; 14 
10 This is the view, amongst others, of K Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (20 ed, C F Müller, Karlsruhe 1995) 79. 
11 The Federal Civil Court, above n 5 decided the tape case to be a question of Administrative Law. 
To my way of thinking this incorrect as Coalition Agreements deal with Constitutional Law. 
12 It is noteworthy that the Coalition Agreement of December 1996 between New Zealand First and 
the New Zealand National Party expressively states this fact under Point 14: "The Parties agree 
that this agreement shall not be justiciable in the Courts of New Zealand". 
13 See for example, P Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (7 ed, Routledge, 
London, 1997) 54. 
14 This competence is called "Organisationsgewalt" (power to decide about the organisation).  See E 
W Böckenförde, Die Organisationsgewalt der Bundesregierung (2 ed, Duncker & Hurnblot, Berlin, 
1998) .
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that is the Chancellor decides how many ministers he or she wants to have in the 
Cabinet, what competences shall be vested in which ministries, and who shall be 
nominated to the Federal President, to be appointed by him, as a Federal Minister. 15 
But, the reality of a Coalition Government is that the negotiators of the Coalition 
Agreement reach terms on the composition of the Cabinet.  According to German 
practice each partner of the Coalition is free to choose the person that that partner 
wants to sit at the Cabinet table.  At the end of the negotiating process the Federal 
Chancellor has to ratify the decisions of the negotiators of the Coalition Agreement, 
not as a legal obligation by as a fact 
(b) According to the Constitution of the FRG, the Federal Chancellor 
determines the general guidelines of the Federal Government's policy ("allgemeine 
Richtlinien der Politik"). 16 Within the framework set up by these guidelines, each 
Federal Minister leads his or her ministry independently and on his or her own 
responsibility.  But this regulation in the Constitution is only one side of the coin; the 
other side is the Coalition Agreement. The modern Coalition is not the small size of 
the Ten Commandments but that of a telephone directory of a middle town.  For 
instance, the Coalition Agreement between the SPD and the Greens in North­Rhine 
Westphalia (Germany's largest state), contains 178 tightly printed pages.  The 
Coalition Agreement between the SPD and the Greens establishing the Federal 
Government in 1998 is shorter, but nevertheless contains a large number of demands ­ 
all of them together limiting the power of the Federal Chancellor and of the ministers 
sitting in his cabinet. 
(c) The Constitution of the FRG prescribes that the Members of the Federal 
Parliament (the "Bundestag") shall not be bound by any instructions, but only by 
conscience. 17 What about this elementary provision of Parliamentary Law if the 
Coalition Agreement (as is usually the case) demands that the Members of Parliament 
who are members of the Coalition Parties have to refrain from crossing the floor ? 
If there exists a contradiction between the Constitution and the Coalition Agreement ­ 
how is this problem to be solved?  In order to find the answer to this question we have to 
distinguish the legal sphere of that issue from the political sphere. In the legal sphere, 
15 For the powers of the German Head of State see Ingo von Münch, An Example of Republicanism: The 
German Presidency (1997) 20 UNSWLJ 466. 
16 See Article 65(1) of the Basic Law.  "The Federal Chancellor shall determine and be responsible for 
general policy guidelines". 
17 See Article 38(1) of the Basic Law. "They (the members of the Bundestag) shall not be bound by any 
instruction, only by their conscience".
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terms of a Coalition Agreement cannot amend the Constitution. 18 The rights and powers 
of the Federal Chancellor, of the Ministers of the Federal Government, and of the 
Members of the Parliament cannot be shifted or even modified by a Coalition Agreement. 
In the political sphere, it is obvious that it is the political interests of the Federal 
Chancellor and of the Members of his Cabinet and of the Members of Parliament who are 
representing the parties of the Coalition to follow the policies fixed in the negotiations 
which have led to the Coalition Agreement.  This following does not mean a waiver of 
competences but the consideration that it is necessary, or at least useful, to keep in line 
with one's  own political party. 
The distinction between the legal sphere and the political sphere loses some of its 
difficulties if we keep in mind that the Coalition Agreement has been negotiated and 
signed by the top politicians involved.  For example, the Coalition Agreement between 
the CDU and the FDP, which was the political basis of the last Federal Government, had 
been signed by the then Federal Chancellor Dr Helmut Kohl in his capacity as leader 
(Chairman) of the CDU, and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Klaus Kinkel, as 
Leader of the FDP.  After the spectacular defeat of the Coalition Government of the CDU 
and the FDP in the General Election of 27 September 1998, the SDP and the Greens 
established a new government on the basis of a Coalition Agreement of 20 October 1998, 
which has been signed by, amongst others,  the in­coming Federal Chancellor, Mr 
Gerhard Schroder, and subsequent Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Joschka Fischer.  It 
has to be underlined again that the Coalition Agreement are agreements concluded 
between political parties 19 not between state organs and not between parliamentary 
groups. 
IV POLITICAL PROBLEMS 
As has been mentioned already Coalition Governments are the norm, in the FRG. 
Everybody is accustomed to this form of government.  But this custom does not 
exclude some criticism of Coalition Governments.  The main points in discussion are 
the following: 
(1) The existence of a Coalition Government diminishes the political position 
of Parliament and of the Government.  The political decision making process shifts 
18 According to Article 79 of the Basic Law, the Basic Law can be amended only by a law expressly 
modifying or supplementing its text.  Such a law must be carried by two thirds of the Members of 
the Bundestag (the lower house) and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat (the Senate). 
19 In the FRG, the Coalition Agreements, after having been negotiated, are proposed to the supreme 
organ of the Political Party (Congress; General Assembly) for approval.  Therefore, the negotiators 
will not agree terms whose approval by the Political Party might be doubtful.
72 (1999) 30 VUWLR 
from clear procedures to rather informal conversations.  In addition, one of the most 
important principles of a modern Constitution, namely the separation of powers, is 
circumvented under a Coalition Government. 
(2) Under a Coalition Government the political position of the party leaders is 
strengthened, whereas the position of the Party Organisations is weakened.  Only a 
few members of the political parties involved are members of the Coalition 
Committees, which are established by the Coalition Agreements, with the task to 
solving problems, difficulties or disputes between the Coalition Partners. 20 
(3) The sittings of the Coalition Committee are not public.  Negotiations in the 
Committee are, therefore, regarded as a form of secret diplomacy, whereas the 
principle of democracy demands transparency.  The ordinary members of the political 
parties do not participate in resolving the disputes. 
(4) The existence of a Coalition Government requires the politics of 
compromises. The result of those compromises does not strengthen the Government 
in power.  None of the partners of a Coalition Government is able to push through its 
own ideas without consent of the Coalition partner. 
(5) Due to the compromises, the political responsibility of the Coalition 
Partners is blurred.  Each Coalition partner may say that the other Partner is the brake 
on the Coalition Government, hindering a good policy to be done by the Government. 
(6) The criticism of Coalition Governments culminates in blaming the German 
type of electoral system which is nearly identical with New Zealand’s Mixed­Member 
Proportional (MMP) electoral system. 21 The main argument to be heard against the 
German proportional electoral system is that this electoral system often leads to a 
relative majority only, 22 whereas the First­Past­the Post system (FPP) leads to an 
absolute majority of one Political Party in Parliament. 
20 The new German Coalition Government of SPD and Greens has had, initially, some problems of 
communication between the Coalition Partners.  The Coalition Committee, composed of 16 
members (eight from each Party) was soon regarded as to be too big.  For this reason, an informal 
"Koalitionsrunde" (a sort of a small round table) has been established; in addition to that, the 
leaders of the Parliamentary Groups of both Parties have been asked to meet at the beginning of 
each week for information purposes. 
21 The differences between the German and the New Zealand's Electoral System refer only to 
technical details.  For the view in New Zealand see Geoffrey and Matthew Palmer, Bridled Power, 
New Zealand Government under MMP (3 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997). 
22 However, in some of the States of the FRG, MMP has led to absolute majorities in the states 
parliaments, for example, in Bavaria and in Saxonia.
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The dispute about the advantages and the disadvantages of both electoral system with 
the pro and contra arguments, often seems to be more a creed than a rational reflection. 
For a politically interested lawyer, criteria to be considered should be: checks and 
balances; fairness; justice; efficiency. 
From all perspectives the proportional electoral system has to be preferred.  In this 
system, checks and balances are anchored already in the Government itself.  The 
necessity to find a compromise is an essential part of democracy.  The proportional 
electoral system guarantees the representation of minorities in Parliament.  Worldwide, 
the proportional electoral system is in advance.  In countries, in which this system has not 
been introduced yet, oppositions demand its introduction.  Even in the United Kingdom, 
which has to be regarded as the strongest fortress of the FPP­electoral system, the British 
Members of the European Parliament will be elected in 1999 on the basis of the 
proportional voting system; the same will happen in future with 56 of 129 Members of 
the Scottish Parliament.  The Scottish solution seemed to be indispensable due to the fact 
that the Tories had not won a single constituency in Scotland in the last General Election; 
even the Labour Party believed that a Parliament without any opposition would be an 
institution without sense.  The British Electoral Reform Society has been fighting for a 
change in the British electoral system for decades. 23 With regard to efficiency, the 
German experience is that Coalition governments are not less efficient than one­party­ 
governments.  Coalition governments have solved the gigantic political, economic, social 
and legal problems after 1945 and after the reunification of Germany in 1990. 
V CONCLUSION 
Despite several disadvantages and problems, Coalition Governments are the best way to 
govern, in the future, countries with complex societies. A Coalition Government 
necessarily has to find compromises between the interests of various groups of the 
society.  Life, in general, demands to find compromises every day – why not in political 
life as well? 
23 The commission, which has been established by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, to examine a 
reform of the electoral system in the United Kingdom, has proposed a modest modification of the 
FPP Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System (The Stationery Office, London, 1998). 
According to my view the proposal of the commission is unsatisfactory.
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